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RACE, CLASS, AND STRUCTURAL
DISCRIMINATION:
ON VULNERABILITY WITHIN THE POLITICAL

PROCESS
ATIBA R. ELLISt
I. INTRODUCTION

A number of recent judicial and legislative transformations have defined
the modem scope of the right to vote. These transformations have arguably
narrowed African-Americans' ability to exercise the franchise. These
changes include the decision in Shelby County v. Holder] to limit the
effectiveness of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the seeming consensus
around the propriety of heightened regulation of the right to vote through
implementing voter identification laws, and the long-standing consensus
around felon disenfranchisement laws. All three of these issues implicate
the African-American community in particular as some have argued that
these are the enduring legacies of-and the imposition of-a new era of
Jim Crow. 2
Yet, another more recent event must refocus our attention on the issue of

the African Americans and the franchise.

Specifically, the events in

tProfessor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law. The author would like to thank Dr.
Kareem Crayton for his invitation to this symposium and the National Bar Association and the St.
John's Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice for sponsoring and publishing this symposium.
Versions of this thesis have been presented at the 2014 Mid-Atlantic People of Color Legal Scholarship
Conference, the New Scholars Forum of West Virginia University College of Law, the Tulane Law
School 2014 Forum on the Future of Law and Inequality, and the American Constitution Society 2014
Scholar's Gaggle. The author is appreciative of the feedback given at these various gatherings, and he
wishes to thank in particular Spencer Overton, Daniel Tokaji, M. Isabel Medina, Matthew Titolo, Shine
Tu, Saru Matambanadzo, and Kendra Fershee. The author would also like to acknowledge the support
of the WVU College of Law Bloom/Hodges Faculty Scholarship Fund for support of this research.
Finally, the author would like to acknowledge the research support of Richard Morris and Jason Turner.
All errors are the responsibility of the author. Comments may be directed to atiba.ellis@mail.wvu.edu.
I Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013).
2 See Atiba R. Ellis, The Meme of Voter Fraud, 63 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 879, 909 (2014)
("Prominent Democratic officials, activist voting rights groups, and left-leaning political organizations
back the assertion that recent voter regulations replicate Jim Crow-era policies of wholesale exclusion
of people of color through regulations that overly burden the exercise of their right to vote.") and id. at
n. 222 (collecting examples).

34

JOURNAL OFCIVIL RIGHTS& ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT [Vol. 28:1

Ferguson, Missouri 3 in the summer of 2014 revealed police abuse in both
the killing of Michael Brown and the militarized siege of policing in the
wake of subsequent protests. The examination of Ferguson that followed
the unrest of that summer and fall revealed a structure built on the poverty
of the St. Louis suburb's African-American residents. 4 The media also
discovered that these same residents of Ferguson were effectively locked
out of the political process. 5
At the time, I argued in a blog post that this appeared to be the result of
the phenomenon of structural racism and exposed the vulnerability of such
communities to political domination. 6 Indeed, this paper seeks to extend
that discussion and to give initial thoughts about the key issues that lie at
the intersection of race and class within the American political process.
From it, it is plausible to conclude that a lockout dynamic within the
political process exists at a level that is far removed from concerns of
typical high theory law-of-politics jurisprudence. 7 As will be discussed
below, this lockout problem has been examined on the levels of partisans
and political process, with an accompanying disdain for the race-conscious
vulnerabilities that seem to undergird the political problems that the
Ferguson situation illustrates.
The goal of this paper is to illustrate this racially intersecting lockout
problem and to argue for the importance of attending to this problem within
Specifically, this paper will
the context of the law of democracy.
illuminate the heart of this problem: the intersecting vulnerabilities that
poor people of color suffer from within the political and economic process.
Such vulnerability lies at the heart of both the historical and present-day
discrimination within the franchise (and the structures that affect it). This
paper focuses on the idea that vulnerability to the majoritarian forces and
3 In response to the ongoing protest and siege policing, I wrote a commentary for the American
Constitution Society blog. See Atiba R. Ellis, Seeing Ferguson Through the Lens of StructuralRacism,
ACS BLOG (Aug. 21, 2014), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/seeing-ferguson-through-the-lens-ofstructural-racism.
4 Id. (collecting sources).
5 Additionally, the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") recently filed a suit alleging
discrimination in the process of school board elections. ACLU Sues Ferguson-FlorissantSchool
District, Charging Electoral System Undermines African-American Vote, ACLU.ORG (Dec. 18, 2014),
https://www.aclu.org/racial-justice-voting-rights/aclu-sues-ferguson-florissant-school-district-chargingelectoral-system.
6 Others too have recognized that procedural flaws in the political process have had the effect of
locking out African American voters in Ferguson. The Editorial Board, Race and Voting Rights in
Ferguson, NYTIMES.COM (Jan 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/05/opinion/race-and-votingrights-in-ferguson.html; Carson Whitelemons, How Restrictive Voting Laws Block Ferguson 's Citizens
BRENNANCENTER.ORG
(Aug.
21,
2014),
From
Having
Their
Fair
Say,
http://www.brennancenter.org/print/12237.
7 Id.
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inequities in the political process ought to serve as a factor in defining the
harms that minority populations suffer within the political process. The
contention here is that such vulnerability premised on the confluence of
historical factors such as race and socioeconomic status creates a particular
risk that the interests of such groups will not be met and that the people
within these groups will not be able to participate fully within the political
process.
To offer this perspective, Part II of this paper discusses a historical
perspective on the long history of voting rights to demonstrate the core
reasons why, and the evolution of, race-conscious remedies to insure
inclusion of minorities in the franchise. This background then serves to
situate the doctrinal and ideological shift away from race-conscious
remedies illustrated by the Court's decision in Shelby County. By using that
case as a lens, the paper demonstrates that despite their continued salience,
the Court deems traditional race-conscious remedies suspect for primarily
ideological reasons. Part III re-imagines these remedies through the lens of
what this paper calls political vulnerability. This idea, synthesized from
sources in the literatures of political inequality, intersectionality of racism
and economic inequality, and structural racism, argues that irrational
marginalization due to one's status as a member of the political underclass
can yet should not exclude one from the political process. This Part will
further define this problem and tease out considerations for a framework
based upon this intersectionality analysis.
Part IV concludes this paper by offering some initial thoughts on how to
create legal interventions to address the problems faced by the communities
that lie at the intersection of race and class within the political process. It
will advocate for engraining this lens into our voting rights jurisprudence
by recommending possible policy and legal alternatives to the incomplete
scheme we currently have.
II. RACIAL HIERARCHIES AND THE EVOLUTION OF VOTING RIGHTS

To start with the obvious: racial hierarchies that condition full status on
the possession of characteristics of characteristics of "whiteness" 8 have
8 By whiteness, I mean what scholars in the critical race studies literature have meant: a status that
is based upon "white" racial appearance, which entitles the possessor to full legal status and privilege in
relation to the rights within society. See, e.g., Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L.
REv. 1707, 1734-36 (1993). This status is defined in relation to who is "white" as well as who is not
white, and thus relies upon a mechanism of subordination to achieve. See generally, EDIBERTO ROMAN,
CITIZENSHIP AND ITS EXCLUSIONS: A CLASSICAL, CONSTITUTIONAL, AND CRITICAL RACE CRITIQUE

83-118 (2010) (examining the dejure subordinate status of minorities and women in nineteenth century
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dominated, and as many have argued, still dominate American society.
Despite claims of a post-racial America where minorities are presumed
welcome throughout American civic life, this state of affairs continues to
define and condition our understandings and the privileges that derive from
this ideologically driven hierarchy affect the modem political process still. 9
This thesis explains why societal conflict continues to exist due to the
inherent hierarchies that racial subordination creates and imposes. 10
Acknowledging this lens at the outset and the enormity of the historical
and modem evidence that support this conclusion is necessary to
thoroughly assess the modem state of politics in the United States. Seen as
a battle against majoritarian racial tyranny on the one hand and the
imposition of a civil rights model imposing a norm of political equality
through the effective use of the right to vote on the other, what becomes
clear is that this battle has been a seesaw effort to counteract majoritarian
exclusionary structures with rights-enabling legal mechanisms.
This
subsection seeks to briefly provide the necessary historical frame to
illustrate this thesis and illustrate the problem of continued and evolved
racial subordination within the political process. However, to illustrate
this, we must begin from the premise that racial subordination has
dominated the political process.
A. The History of Disenfranchisement
To state the problem briefly: in each era of the American experiment,
racial subordination spurred by majoritarian domination has created
conflict despite the fact that the scope of rights for racial minorities
expanded in each era. At each time that the pallet of rights expanded, such
change was eventually followed by contraction that curtailed and limited

America).
9 See, e.g., Stacy Hawkins, Diversity, Democracy & Pluralism: Confronting the Reality of Our
Inequality, 66 MERCER L. REV. 578, 579-80 (2015) ("In the past generation, as the demographic

diversity of the nation has rapidly expanded, racial and ethnic minorities have remained shut out of
participation in the civic life of our nation.")

10 At the time of editing this paper, such conflict has been made tragically clear in the extreme in
the murder of nine congregants in the historic Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church on June
16, 2015. See Jason Horowitz, Nick Corasaniti, and Ashley Southall, "Nine Killed in Shooting at Black
Church
in
Charleston,"
N.Y.
TIMES,
June
17,
2015,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/18/us/church-attacked-in-charleston-south-carolina.htmi.
Yet, while

hate crimes such as this reveal the extreme of racial prejudice, institutions that nonetheless replicate
racial subjugation and lock out minorities through structures built upon racial hierarchies. See,
generally, DARIA ROITHMAYR, REPRODUCING RACISM:

How EVERYDAY CHOICES LOCK IN WHITE

ADVANTAGE (2014). Part of the claim of this paper is that the electoral system and its components that

exclude by impact should be seen as part of this lockout effect.

2015]

RACE CLASS AND STRUCTURAL DISCRIMINATION

the effectiveness of the right to vote. II
However, prior to the Civil War, direction and control of the electoral
process was largely given over to the control of state governments.12
Accordingly, the rationales that states provided to include-or excludepersons from the franchise were given great deference. This deference,
most clearly expressed in the few structural provisions in the 1789
Constitution regarding elections13, allowed states to choose to include or
exclude whichever of the persons in its jurisdiction that it deemed fit. This
tended to benefit white, male property owners in following with the
political theory of the time-that one must own a stake in the political
community to usefully participate in its governance.1 4 This also facilitated
and replicated the belief that white males were morally and intellectually
superior and thus should be given deference in the process.15 This is the
foundational structure of the American democratic process.
The idea of equality between racial groups, and thus an entitlement to
political equality of all male citizens did not exist as a matter of
The Reconstruction
constitutional law until Reconstruction.16
Amendments and the laws put in place to enforce those laws were designed
to establish and facilitate a norm of economic and political equality so that
I

See generally, LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN

REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994). More specifically, I discuss this at length in my recent article,
Atiba R. Ellis, Reviving the Dream: Equality and the Democratic Promise in the Post-Civil Rights Era,
2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 789 (2015).
12 See Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2263-67 (2013); see also
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 124-26 (1970); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 172-73
(1874).
13 Probably most significant of these provisions is the Elections Clause, U.S. CONST. art I, § 4, cl. I
("The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or
alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of [choosing] Senators."). It has been subject of recent
litigation regarding the extent to which individual states may place additional qualifications (such as
proof of citizenship requirements) in federal elections. See Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz.,
Inc., supra n. 12. Additionally, the Electors Clause also delegates power to choose electors to state
legislatures. U.S. CONST. art I sec. 2, cl. 1.
14 The rationale for this was that property owners were deemed to have a sufficient stake in the
community and could be considered to represent the interests of the property-less. See ALEXANDER
KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO Vote: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 9

(2000 rev. ed. 2009), In this sense, the right to vote could be considered a form of property that then
could be subject to privileging and exclusion based upon notions of whiteness. Cf generally Harris,
supra n. 8 (defining whiteness as a status that defines access to various property rights).
15 Put another way, this facilitated the creation of white supremacy. By white supremacy, I mean
"a political, economic and cultural system in which whites overwhelmingly control power and material
resources, conscious and unconscious ideas of white superiority and entitlement are widespread, and
relations of white dominance and non-white subordination are daily reenacted across a broad array of
institutions and social settings." Frances Lee Ansley, Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class and the Future of
Civil Rights Scholarship, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 993, 1024 n. 129 (1989).
16 Ellis, Reviving the Dream, supra n. II at 792 and n.5 (acknowledging that no notion of equality
existed in the American constitution until the drafting of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments).
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freed slaves could have the opportunity for equal treatment under the law.17
They served to define citizens as those who were born or naturalized in the
United States.' 8 The Equal Protection Clause then sought to insure that the
state provide equal protection of the laws for all persons under the
government of the United States19 and the Due Process Clause was
intended to insure that each person who suffered a deprivation of life,
20
liberty, or property would be protected from overreach by the state.
Indeed, this concern for counteracting the structures of the state to
insured that freed slaves would be able to participate fully in the
democratic process. Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment, in
particular, sets for a penalty provision designed to insure that states would
not discriminate against minorities in the political process. 2 1 With an
exception for persons who committed "treason or other crimes," the section
penalized disenfranchisement undertaken by the state through eliminating
that state's representation in congress in proportion to the amount of
disenfranchisement the state undertook.2 2 Yet even this was not seen as
sufficient. The Fifteenth Amendment was established to provide that no
state would discriminate on the basis of race when it came to the right to
vote.2 3 These two structural protections provided the means by which the
federal government would protect against majoritarian efforts to diminish
the political equality of African-Americans.
And yet, this effort towards political equality was betrayed by
retrenchment in the period following Reconstruction. The Supreme Court
in particular narrowed the underpinnings of the laws designed to protect the
political process through narrowly construing those provisions, preventing
de jure discrimination on the basis of race but allowing de facto
discrimination that only had a disparate impact on the basis of race. 24 As a
17
18
19
20
21

Id. at 819-25 (describing the aims of the Reconstruction Amendments and attendant legislation).
U.S. CONST. amend XIV § I cl. 1.
U.S. CONST. amend XIV § I cl. 4.
Id. at cl. 2.
Id. at § 2 cl. 2.

22 Id.

23 U.S. CONST. amend XV § 1.
24 Atiba R. Ellis, A Price Too High: Efficiencies, Voter Suppression, and the Redefining of
Citizenship,43 SOUTHWESTERN L. REv. 549, 552-53 (2014). In a line of jurisprudence that endured as
a cornerstone of Jim Crow politics, the Court made clear that it would interpret the Fifteenth
Amendment narrowly despite disparate treatment by state governments that had the result of
disenfranchising African Americans. So long as the formal command of not discriminating on the basis
of race as upheld, the Supreme Court would uphold any other "rational" voting regulation. This was
made clear in Williams v. Mississippi, where the use of poll taxes and literacy tests was upheld because
there was no overt discriminatory administration of the suffrage provisions. See also Minor v.
Happersett (upholding state provisions that denied women the franchise on the basis that no provision
existed to protect a woman's right to vote). Williams and Guinn shows that the Court saw its role in
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result, mass disenfranchisement through felon disenfranchisement laws,
poll taxes, literacy tests, and other mechanisms of Jim Crow defined the
first generation of vote suppression. 25 African-American voters were
effectively excluded throughout large swaths of the United States, thus
facilitating a second period-the first, slavery-of white majoritarian
domination.
The civil rights revolution was predicated on the idea that these
structures ought to be eliminated. 26 In particular, the passage of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 sought to insure that the command of the Fifteenth
Amendment would be enforced. The VRA gave the federal government
the ability to enforce voting rights through insuring that minority citizens
would not be excluded from voting on the basis of outright racial
discrimination or laws that would substantially disadvantage their
participation in the political process. 2 7 In other words, the VRA was
designed to specifically address vote denial claims and vote dilution claims.
Additionally, the VRA nationalized election laws through both its national
enforcement provision in Section 2 that forbad racial discrimination 28 and
the preclearance provisions set forth in Section 5, which required that states
that had a history of discrimination in voting and evidence of disparate
rates of participation between whites and minorities were required to
submit their voting rights changes for approval by the U.S. Department of
Justice prior to implementing those changes 29 .
Statutory transformation was coupled with judicial intervention and
innovation. Reynolds v. Sims 30 and its progeny established the principle of
"one person, one vote." The Court then held in Harper v. Virginia State
enforcing the strictures of the Constitution while at the time allowing broad latitude to state regulation
that did not run afoul of the Constitution. This rationale became the basis of the "Mississippi Plan"
which was adopted by states across the South to disenfranchise African-Americans. See Atiba R. Ellis,
The Cost of the Vote: Poll Taxes, Voter Identification Laws, and the Price of Democracy, 86 DENVER.
U. L. REV. 1023, 1043 (2009).
25 See Ellis, Cost of the Vote, supra n. 24 at 1043.
26 As the reader may observe at this point, this transformation came about because of the
persuasiveness of movement politics during the 1950s and 1960s rather than any sudden evolution in
the thinking of the courts or the legislature. The long scope of efforts by activists throughout the United
States created political and moral pressure that transformed the thinking of the men in the elected and
unelected branches of government. See generally Gary May, BENDING TOWARD JUSTICE: THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

(2013).

27 See Glenda Daniels, UnfinishedBusiness: Protecting Voting Rights in the Twenty-First Century,
81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1928, 1938 (2013) (describing the purpose of the Voting Rights Act).
28 52 U.S.C.A. § 10301.
29 52 U.S.C. 52 U.S.C.A. § 10303(a). As will be discussed below, this provision is currently
inoperative in light of the Shelby County decision.

30 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Reynolds addressed disproportionality in state legislative districts.
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), extended this requirement of "one person, one vote" to
congressional districts.
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Board of Elections that poll taxes in federal elections violated the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. 31
There, the Court reaffirmed its often-pronounced view that the right to vote
was a fundamental right, and that the ability to pay a tax ran contrary to the
nature of this right.32 Taken together, these provisions transformed the
structure of election law by subjecting voting rights claims to strict scrutiny
and requiring that the underlying structure of state and federal elections to
guarantee an equal vote that represented the crowning achievement of
ending de jure white political domination. The effect was to create an
electorate where all have access to participation, and that protection was
guaranteed on a constitutional and statutory basis.
However, the domination that had been eliminated from statutory and
constitutional law was facilitated by other means. And the Court in
particular played a role in attempting to evolve this jurisprudence to
address evolving forms of discrimination through the manipulation of the
structures of political participation. This role can be traced back to the
Court's effort to transform the meaning of the Fifteenth Amendment
through narrowing its interpretation. In City of Mobile v. Bolden, the Court
held that the Fifteenth Amendment could only be invoked to pursue claims
where intentional discrimination had been demonstrated 33 ; in response
Congress amended the VRA to insure that Section 2 claims could also be
brought under a disparate impact theory 34 . Additionally, when it comes to
constitutional vote denial claims based on a harm suffered due to a
regulatory impact-as opposed to a claim based on express discrimination
on the basis of race-the Court has required a balancing of the state's
35
interests with the interests that the voter claims to have been harmed.
These few, yet significant, data points illustrate the overarching concern,
that through efforts to insure that access to the vote not be dominated
through the creation of a rights structure, that structure has steadily eroded
since the passage of the VRA. Put another way, this doctrinal re-crafting
and limitation represents a substantial impairment of the opportunity to
accomplish the goal of preventing majoritarian tyranny. In essence, the
race-conscious remedies that have been allowed have steadily eroded
31 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
32 Id. at 669-70.
33 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
34 The Court noted that this "totality of the circumstances" approach designed to overrule Bolden
was authoritative in light of the amendments to the VRA. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 44
(1986).
35 See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 430 (1992); Crawford v. Marion Co.; Crawford v. Marion
Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 195 (2008).
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through doctrinal narrowing.
B. Shelby County and the Undoing of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act
Shelby County represents the latest of these efforts and a true curtailment
of the ability to utilize race conscious remedies. 36 Yet, unlike the narrowing
based on doctrinal interpretation, Shelby County represents a choice to
constrict the ultimate goal of race-conscious remedies in election law.
Indeed, Shelby County differs from the aforementioned cases in that the
Court expressly disavowed Congress's judgment concerning the
effectiveness of race-conscious remedies and, in effect, declared that
progress concerning improvement in race relations was sufficient to merit
overriding congressional judgment.
In Shelby County, the Court declared Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights
Act unconstitutional, thus ending nearly half a century of preclearance
approvals under Section 5. The Court's opinion reached the conclusion
that the current scope of 4(b) preclearance failed constitutional muster
because it offended the "equal sovereignty" due each state in voting
regulation. 37 Chief Justice Roberts reached this conclusion because "the
conditions that originally justified [the preclearance measures that justified
differing treatment of states] no longer characterize voting in the covered
jurisdictions." 38 Roberts pointed to the growth in voter participation and to
the increased numbers of minority elected officials over the life of the
VRA.39 Based on this, Roberts found that "[c]overage [under section 4(b)]
is based on decades-old data and eradicated practices." 40 According to
Roberts, "[r]acial disparity in those numbers was compelling evidence
justifying the preclearance remedy and the coverage formula. There is no
41
longer such a disparity."
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg disagreed with Roberts' conclusions.
Ginsburg opined that the Court failed to allow deference to Congress's

36 See Atiba R. Ellis, Shelby Co. v. Holder: The Crippling of the Voting Rights Act, ACS BLOG
(June 27, 2013) https://www.aeslaw.org/acsblog/shelby-co-v-holder-the-crippling-of-the-voting-rightsact (drawing from the author's opinion on Shelby County on the ACS blog.); See also generally Ellis,
Reviving the Dream, supra n. I1 (author's recent and more detailed discussion of these issues). This
subsection and the subsection that follow draw on and extend ideas contained in the aforementioned
locations.
37 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612, 2623 (2013).
38 Id. at 2618.
39 Id. at 2619.
40 Id. at 2617.
41 Id. at 2627-28.
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authority to legislate under the Fifteenth Amendment. 42 She also rejected
the Court's "equal sovereignty" argument, stating that the principle is only
applicable to the conditions on States for admission to the union. 43
Ginsburg also dissented from the majority's view that Congress lacked
sufficient evidence upon which to authorize Section 4(b). She pointed to
the record Congress had amassed on twenty-first century voting
discrimination. 44 She concluded that with the preclearance provision
effectively gutted, the country now faces the possibility of the erosion of
45
voting rights.
By declaring the coverage provisions of Section 4 unconstitutional, the
preclearance provisions of Section 5 are unenforceable. This represents a
victory for those who wish to see less federal involvement in elections.
The majority opinion left it up to Congress to create a new coverage
formula, but it is unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future. 4 6 Moreover,
this decision limits the ability to remedy voting rights violations to
plaintiffs lawsuits to Section 2 of the Act. In comparison to the
government's ability to proactively supervise election laws under Section
5, Section 2 private litigation will prove costly and time consuming to
plaintiffs and will rely on retroactive court decisions that come long after
the harm. Effectively, voting rights enforcement has now become more
costly.
While framed as a matter of statutory interpretation, the Shelby County
opinion held in essence that the covered jurisdictions, mainly in the exConfederate South, have changed sufficiently enough to warrant the
reconsideration of selective preclearance enforcement.
In this view,
coverage formulas rooted to a past of racial discrimination in voting
ignores racial progress. Indeed, Roberts implied that to hold to such
formulas amounts to punishment of the states covered for their racial

42 Id. at 2638 (Ginsberg, J.,
dissenting).
43 Id.at 2649.
44 Id.at 2642-44, 2652.
45 Id. at 2651 ("The sad irony of today's decision lies in its utter failure to grasp why the VRA has
proven effective. The Court appears to believe that the VRA's success in eliminating the specific
devises extant in 1965 means that preclearance is no longer needed. With that belief, and the argument
derived from it, history repeats itself').
46 In commenting in the immediate aftermath of Shelby County, I opined that because of "the
hyper-partisan nature of national politics, it is difficult to imagine how the current Congress or any
Congress elected in the foreseeable future would agree on a new coverage formula." See Atiba R. Ellis,
Shelby County, AL v. Holder, The Crippling of the Voting Rights Act, WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL
OF
LAW
NEWS
(June
28,
2013),
available
at
http://law.wvu.edu/news/2013/6/28/ShelbyCounty-vs-Holder
(June 28, 2013). While advocates
continue to seek a revised and robust form of Section 4(b) to revive Section 5 preclearance, the political
realities make this highly unlikely.
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history. 4 7
This facile analysis sidesteps the arguments on the record about the
degree of progress made by the covered jurisdictions 4 8 and the ultimate
question of whether racial political equality has been achieved. Instead, the
majority simply asserted that Congress exceeded its basis in relying on the
2006 coverage formula. 4 9 Rather than account for the varied forms of
second-generation voter intimidation as evidence on which Congress could
have based its findings, the majority suggests that increased voter
participation demonstrates enough progress towards racial political equality
to effectively scuttle Section 5.50
C. Shelby County andJudicialRetrenchment ConcerningRace-Conscious
Remedies
In this sense, Shelby County seeks to craft a narrative of the post-racial
success of the Voting Rights Act, thus justifying its curtailment. Relying
on this ideological view causes the majority to fall into the trap of wanting
to believe that the markers of progress represent a wide-ranging success
rather than confronting the far more complex reality of contemporary vote
denial. It is important to note the broader context, though. The Shelby
County account of the veritable end-of-history of racial domination in
politics is actually part of a larger post-racial project of the Court. This
project is divorced from, and ultimately blind to, the reality of racial
conflict concerning civil rights issues generally, and voting rights conflicts
in particular.
This ideology of racial progressivity, coupled with the disfavor the
conservative majority has shown towards race conscious governmental
intervention, suggest that the Court believes that race conscious election
law doctrine must be moderated so as to not interfere with this progress.
This is a prime driver of the Court's jurisprudence in shaping contemporary
voting rights law and could lead to the abolition of all but the bare
minimum of race-based protections in right to vote jurisprudence.
Two principle and interrelated frameworks have been deployed through
the Court's recent jurisprudence to implement this trend. The first is
"colorblindness," the view that by force of societal change, race will

47
48
49
50

See Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. at 2629.
See id. at 2632.
See id.at 2629.
Seeid. at2618-19.
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become irrelevant throughout society. 51 In essence, by functioning as a
society that does not make judgments on the basis of race, race will
ultimately become irrelevant in society.
In the election law context, Professor Spencer Overton has critiqued the
adoption of a colorblindness framework by the Court and by scholars and
reformers. Professor Overton argues that race ought to be considered as
''one analytical tool to be considered in conjunction with other factors"
when analyzing election law policies. 52 Indeed, Professor Overton points
out that "[a] consideration of race allows scholars and legal decision
makers to avoid the pitfalls of the 'color-blind card,' an ideological
extreme that mechanically trumps historical considerations, silences
discussion, removes relevant issues from the table, and ignores important
problems." 53 His recognition of the affect of colorblindness ideology aptly
illustrates what has happened in Shelby County.
The second principle at play in these decisions is post-racialism. This
ideology shapes how people view the world in terms of race. 54 The idea of
a "post-racial" society55 relies on the premise that American society has
concluded its struggle with race. As a result, this country has no further
need to discuss issues of race when it comes to the structuring of our laws.
It is the ideology that claims that America has moved beyond race and that
there is thus no need to discuss race as a salient issue. 56
Scholars have explained that post-racialism works as an ideology-it
offers a point of view about the world and, thus, allows the adherent to
consider and reflect on various issues through this particular lens.5 7 In
particular, Professor Sumi Cho points out that the power of post-racialism
is that of making conversations about race irrelevant to the adherent of the
51 For exposition on the constitutional problem of colorblindness generally, see, e.g., Reva B.
Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization:An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality
Cases, 120 YALE L. J. 1278 (2011); Ian Haney-Lopez, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779
(2012); Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Colorblind Remedies and the Intersectionality of Oppression: Policy
Arguments Masqueradingas Moral Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 162 (1994); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of
"Our Constitution Is Color-Blind", 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991).
52 Spencer Overton, A Place at the Table: Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Race, 29 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 469, 472 (2001).
53 Id.at 473.
54 Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589, 1597-98 (2009).
55 Kimberld Williams Crenshaw, Twenty Years of CriticalRace Theory: Looking Back to Move
Forward,43 CoNN. L. REV. 1253, 1313-15 (2011) (observing that a post-racial America is a "racially
egalitarian America" where the post-racial discourse is used to de-historicize race in American society);
see also Lawrence Auster, What is Post-RacialAmerica?, AMNATION.COM (Feb. 25, 2008, 10:56 AM),
http://www.amnation.com/vfr/archives/01000.html (discussing the notion of post-racial America
during an Obama presidency).
56 Cho, Post-Racialism,94 IOWA L. REV. at 1589, 1594-95.
57 Id. at 1594.
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ideology. 58 Conversations about race become irrelevant, and those who
59
wish to discuss race are seen as divisive and destructive.
From the point of view of a post-racial ideology, Section 5 preclearance
represents a bludgeon that crushes the ability of the covered jurisdictions to
legislate freely concerning the electoral process because it excessively
inserts considerations of race within a context that achieved triumph over
racism. It contradicts the notion that by force of societal change through
ignoring race, race will become less of a factor precisely because it is a
race-conscious mechanism that requires the government to mediate the
ongoing tension between majoritarian racial dominance and the rights of
the minority. Moreover, the philosophy claims we live in a post-racial
world, and a Congress that fails to recognize this has overstepped its
constitutional role. In essence, the premise behind Shelby County is that
we now no longer live in a racialized world, or at least in a significantly
less raciallized world, and thus Congress exceeded its power in legislating
on the basis of race when the terms of the debate of race have changed.
The confluence of post-racial aspirations and colorblindness philosophy
licensed the Court to constrain the race-conscious remedy that is the Voting
Rights Act.
This post-racial view forms a lens larger than just voting rights by itself,
and is directed at the larger civil rights project. This idea is made clear
when one looks not just at Shelby County, but also at the larger arguments
made in the cases concerning race conscious governmental policies.
Certain commentators opposing Section 560 and the Justices most vocal
about its abolition 61 share this post-racial view. When we expand our lens
beyond voting to other race-related issues of the term, the scope of this
post-racialist view becomes clearer.
For example, in Fisher v. University of Texas,62 the issue ultimately
raised by the opponents of the University of Texas' policy was the very
constitutionality of race-based affirmative action. At its heart of this
58 Id. at 1594-95.
59 Id. at 1595, 1601-02.
60 See, e.g., Hans von Spakovsky, Shelby County v. Holder: The Shelby County Section 5
Showdown, SCOTUSBLOG, (Feb. 15, 2013, 5:51 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/02/shelbycounty-v-holder-the-shelby-county-section-5-showdown/; Joshua Thompson, Online VRA Symposium:
It's time for the Court to review Section 5, SCOTUSBLOG, (Sept. 12, 2012, 11:26 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/201 2/09/online-vra-symposium-its-time-for-the-court-to-review-section-5/.
61 See Northwest Austin v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 212 (2009) (Thomas, J. concurring in judgment
and dissenting in part); Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. at 2631-32 (referring to Justice Clarence Thomas, who
has repeatedly articulated the view that the Voting Rights Act exceeds the powers of Congress to
enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, and therefore should be struck down in its entirety).
62 Fisher v. University of Texas, 133 S.Ct. 2411 (2013).
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argument is the propriety of maintaining a system of race conscious
remedies in the face of arguments that suggest that these remedies work a
morally equivalent harm upon members of the majority who view
themselves as deprived by the imposition of affirmative action due to a
63
supposed loss of an opportunity.
The Court has resisted entertaining this claim directly, remanding the
case for further proceedings to address the appropriate standard of strict
scrutiny the lower court applied. The Court at the same time affirmed its
holding on the constitutionality of affirmative action in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke64, and again in Grutter v. Bollinger,65
Gratz v. Bollinger,66 and ParentsInvolved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District No. 1.67 While affirmative action has been upheld in these
cases, as a doctrinal and ideological matter, the conservative-leaning
majority of the Court has expressed growing skepticism about its
underlying rationale. 68 These cases represent components of the Court's
view that race as grounds for governmental action is disfavored as a
practical and a moral consideration; this analysis tracks the colorblindness
69
and post-racialism narratives.
63 This equivalent harm rationale illustrates the harm done by the colorblindness rationale. It
allows for an equating of harms done to white people to those done by black people without reference
to the history of political, economic, and social domination imposed by the system of white privilege.
Further, it narrows the consideration of harm to solely intentional racial actions. This reflects the
ahistorical, moralistic, denial-driven nature of colorblind ideology. As Professor Ruthann Robson put
it:
The Supreme Court has created a culture that ignores racism unless it is the product of a particular
individual with a bad motive. It then equated erosions of white privilege with racial injustice. Its
rhetoric proclaimed that affirmative action is un-American and relegated racism to "an unfortunate
past."
See Atiba R. Ellis, Missing Black Men, the Baltimore Uprising, and the Language of Oppression,
ACSBlog (May 1, 2015) http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/missing-black-men-the-baltimore-uprisingand-the-language-of-oppression (quoting Professor Robson).
64 Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
65 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
66 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
67 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
68 Indeed, the Court has chosen to take up Fisher again and will likely rule on the underlying merits
of affirmative action in the coming term. See Fisher v. University of Texas, No 14-981, 576 U.S. (June
29, 2015) (order granting certiorari).
69 Parents Involved, supra n. 72 at 748. Though this has been analyzed in a number of law review
articles, and space constraints prevent a detailed analysis here, and the language of these decisions is
familiar to the reader, it is worth quoting Chief Justice Roberts from ParentsInvolved as it encapsulates
the scope of the colorblindness narrative: "The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race." Id. This pronouncement is contrasted by Justice Sonia Sotomayer's
statements in her dissent in Schulette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1676
(2014) (Sotomayer, dissenting): "As members of the judiciary tasked with intervening to carry out the
guarantee of equal protection, we ought not sit back and wish away, rather than confront, the racial
inequality that exists in our society. It is this view that works harm, by perpetuating the facile notion
that what makes race matter is acknowledging the simple truth that race does matter."
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The essence of this analysis is that the Court has approached these issues
with an underlying post-racial narrative: regulating the democratic process
to protect minorities is no longer necessary because, as the Court said in
Northwest Austin v. Holder, the case that directly foreshadowed Shelby
County, "[t]hings have changed in the South." 70 Moreover, as the narrative
goes, race-conscious considerations in admissions are not only
unnecessary, but also repugnant to the moral philosophy of the Constitution
(that itself apparently espouses colorblind equality). Read together, the
message is that we are past race.
D. Twenty-First Century Vote Suppression and the Salience of Class
The evidence suggests, however, that our struggles concerning race and
voting are far from over. As noted above, in reauthorizing Section 5,
Congress pointed to substantial evidence of continuing racial disparities in
voting. 7 1 Moreover, in the 2012 elections, and prior to Shelby County,
Section 5 was the primary means by which the courts utilized to remedy the
racially disparate effects of election policies that would impact minority
voters.

72

What is important to note about these forms of voter suppression is that
they revolve largely around the problems of political control of the
mechanisms of voting and the impact of voting within political districts.
This present litigation issue ultimately revolves around the question of
whether demonstrated disparate impact upon a minority group without
direct evidence of disparate treatment ought to be sufficient to win Section
2 claims.
What lies under the surface of these claims is the idea that these types of
mechanisms not only have an impact on the basis of race, but they affect
the minority group due to their socioeconomic status. To take a clear look
at vote suppression laws, one realizes that they are not just about race.
Forms of voter suppression like voter identification laws, the narrowing of
70 Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. at 202.
71 Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. at 2641-2.
72 Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008); Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. at 2612.
Salient to this discussion is the fact that in 2012, in both Texas and South Carolina, voters brought
claims under section 5 of the VRA that the voter identification laws created in those states imposed
discriminatory effects on poor minority voters. In both of these situations, federal district courts
enforcing section 5 used the VRA to block implementation of these voter identification laws due to
their potential disparate racial impact on minorities. See Texas v. Holder, 888 F.Supp.2d 113 (D.D.C.
2012) (declaring that the Texas voter id law violated Section 5), vacated and remanded, 133 S.Ct. 2886
(2013); South Carolina v. United States, 898 F.Supp.2d 30 (D.D.C. 2012) (postponing implementation
of the South Carolina voter id law for the 2012 election). Of course, after Shelby County, these
injunctions lack force and these states are free to pursue implementation of the law.
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early voting windows, felon disenfranchisement, and other ways minorities
are excluded from the political process focus expressly on the treatment of
poor people of color within the political process.
For example, voter identification laws, in their strictest form, require
government-issued photographic identification at both the point of
registration and the point of exercising the franchise. 73 While facially
neutral, and thus constitutionally valid under Crawford, these laws
essentially raise the cost of access to the vote for the minority of people
who would otherwise not have to face the burden of obtaining such
identification in order to register and vote. I have previously argued that
this amounts to an indirect cost of voting on the voter through the
imposition of logistical and documentary efforts that must be achieved to
obtain the proper support for the identification. 74 Political science research
suggests that these indirect costs form a strong disincentive to political
participation for those who are socioeconomically disadvantaged.7 5
According to the Brennan Center for Justice, these stringent voter
identification requirements will disenfranchise thousands, including lowincome citizens, minorities, and the elderly. Indeed, over 21 million
citizens do not possess appropriate government-issued photo ID.76
Moreover, to take another example, felon disenfranchisement laws
expressly exclude voters who would otherwise be eligible to vote on the
basis of a prior conviction. A general consensus has existed since early in

73 See Wendy Underhill, Voter Identification Requirements, NAT'L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES
(Mar. 24, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id.aspx.
74 See Ellis, The Cost of the Vote, supra n. 24 at 1034-36 (2009). There, I explain that indirect costs
are the costs a voter has to expend to become eligible to vote. However, these costs are not paid
directly to the government or otherwise related to the actual casting of a ballot. Those costs include the
cost related to a person identifying him or herself, whether through obtaining a government-issued
photographic identification card such as a driver's license, passport, employment card, or some other
related type of card; proving one's citizenship; proving one's current address; proving one's location of
birth; or other requirements that relate to this proof. These costs are imposed not by the state directly,
but by the structure created around voting. Id. Indeed, a 2012 study by the Brennan Center for Justice
at New York University further documented the cost imposed by voter identification laws. See Keesha
Gaskins and Sundeep Iyer, "The Challenge of Obtaining Voter Identification," BRENNAN CENTER FOR
JUSTICE,

http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/egacy/DemocracyVRE/Challenge of_ObtainingVot
er ID.pdf (last visited June 30, 2015). It documented the cumulative burdens suffered by poor voters in
regards to finding transportation to ID-issuing offices, the lack of availability of such offices during
working hours, and how those particular challenges significantly impact the rural poor and people of
color. Id. In Gaskins and Iyer's words, "More than I million eligible voters in these states fall below
the federal poverty line and live more than 10 miles from their nearest ID-issuing office open more than
two days a week. These voters may be particularly affected by the significant costs of the
documentation required to obtain a photo ID." Id. at 1.
75 Ellis, Cost of the Vote, supran. 24. at 1032-34.
76 See Gaskins & Iyer, The Challenge of Obtaining Voter Identification,supra n. 78 (detailing the
economic and racial difficulties in obtaining voter identification).
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the eighteenth century about the propriety of felon disenfranchisement
77
laws, including the Court's upholding the laws in Richardson v. Ramirez.
Yet, their greater effect as been to disenfranchise African-Americans
through targeting felonies at crimes that some largely poor AfricanAmericans committed, and then using felon disenfranchisement as a postconviction, post-incarceration punishment to exclude them from the
78
franchise. This specific intent was illustrated in Hunter v. Underwood,
where the Court struck down the felon disenfranchisement provision of the
Alabama constitution on the grounds of its specific intent to target
minorities.
Yet, beyond this express targeting of minorities, felon
disenfranchisement laws are constitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection clause and the Voting Rights Act, despite
their impact on an estimated 5.8 million people, and specifically 1 out of
79
every 13 African-Americans.
These examples demonstrate the kinds of impact that lie at the
intersection of race and class. These kinds of impact ultimately might be
ignored when one attaches to a view that racial impact is irrelevant because
express disparate treatment has been virtually eliminated. This is the
ultimate blindness created by the ideological trap of post-racial thinking.
Rather than fall prey to the ideological trap that is post-racial thinking,
which allows us to give a blind eye to these issues of structural
disenfranchisement, what is necessary is to tailor race conscious remedies
to respond to the complexities of race and class within the voting context.
The ideological trap of post racialism has the potential to force the political
system (and those of us who theorize about the constitutional regulation of
the political process) to ignore the probability that racial balkanization may
increase rather than decrease in the decades ahead (in contrast to the
narrative of Shelby County). It represents a gap in the way the Court
theorizes about election law (and about civil rights generally), and in the
next part of this paper, I will suggest how the present and future of
American democracy require us to pay attention to not just race or class,
but to race, class, and the particular impact that occurs at the intersection of
race and class.

77 Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (holding that states' disenfranchisement of convicted
felons is consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment).
78 Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985). This echoes the narrow interpretation of the
Fifteenth Amendment discussed infra.
79 See
"Felony
Disenfranchisement,"
SentencingProject.org,
http://www.sentencingproject.org/template/page.cfm?id=133 (last visited July 2, 2015).
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III. POLITICAL VULNERABILITY AND THE RACE-CLASS NEXUS
The Court has often avoided this problem of the particular intersectional
harms suffered by those impacted by both race and class. On the one hand,
it is clear that the command against racial discrimination is well embedded
within the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Fifteenth Amendment's racial anti-discrimination command regarding the
right to vote. As we have seen, these remedies in the election law context
have been narrowed significantly. Yet it is well settled that discrimination
on the basis of race is unconstitutional and illegal as it pertains to
participation in the political process, and the ideological narrative to date is
to limit those remedies to the narrowest conception of such racial
discrimination claims.
This misses the question of vulnerability created by the compounding of
racial discrimination and socioeconomic oppression. It is the contention of
this paper that to go beyond the blind spot created be a narrow focus on
race, these problems should be analyzed within the context of the concept
of political vulnerability and specifically that vulnerability that exists at the
intersection of race and class. This section will begin by offering a
framework for political vulnerability within the context of understanding
this intersection. It will then further inform this view through the added
intellectual framework of structural racism.
A. Class and Conceptions of Political Vulnerability
As we have just seen with voter identification laws, states may regulate
their elections through requiring identification that may impose a barrier on
a significant number of potential voters. The Court's analysis of this issue
deferred to the states purported interest, and it ignored the claim that these
laws can create burdens on those who are least suited to bear them.
This bias on the basis of socioeconomic status failed to sway a majority
of the Court in Crawford, and it is illustrative of how discrimination based
on socioeconomic status can escape analysis. 8 0 Indeed, as I will discuss
momentarily, the Supreme Court has eschewed finding constitutional
protections on the basis of low economic status. This fact points to two
First, that there are those who are especially
important concerns.
80 Indeed, in previous work, I have argued that the long trajectory of the civil rights project has
been one where oppression through means of socioeconomic status has served as a proxy for racial
discrimination and that remedies. See generally, Ellis, Reviving the Dream, supran. 11 (analyzing civil
rights history to illustrate how the civil rights project was attuned to remedying race-based exclusion
and providing economic opportunity).
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vulnerable within the political process, and second, that such vulnerability
creates a concern within the context of the political process when it comes
to not only race, but also issues of poverty.
As a general matter, this concept of vulnerability is a defining
fundamental of antidiscrimination law. In the revolutionary footnote 4 of
United States v. CarolineProducts8l, the Court there identified a history of
vulnerability as a defining trait. The recognition in this footnote that
deference to laws that discriminated against "discrete and insular
minorities" in the political process led to a constitutional revolution. This
recognition is the beginning of our doctrines of strict scrutiny and
undergirds this area of law as well as the broader civil rights project.
However, where such Court doctrine has led to the protection of
minority rights of various sorts under the Fourteenth Amendment, the
protection of the poor has been virtually nonexistent. In their essay, The
Disparate Treatment of Race and Class in Constitutional Jurisprudence,
Mario Barnes and Erwin Chemerensky recognize that the Court "has not
been predisposed to consider class as a suspect category that can or should
be specially protected." 82 They go on to demonstrate that the Court has
expressed reluctance to find that the status of poverty should receive
deference in cases such as San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, and in other cases where socioeconomic status was relevant to
constitutional analysis, Barnes and Chemerensky note that such analysis
was not central to the Court's concern. 83 It is safe to say that the status of
poverty is given little deference in constitutional law.
Yet, critiques of the Court's jurisprudence concerning poverty have led
some scholars to seeing a concept of vulnerability that ought to be
embraced in the law. Professor Julie Nice, in criticizing the Court in
Dandridge v. Williams, pointed to several factors that, for her, showed
vulnerability: (1) historical discrimination; (2) ongoing societal
disapproval; (3) political powerlessness; (4) negative societal
misperception of the group; and (5) the extreme difficulty or impossibility
of changing the traits that define the group. 84 These facts seem to align
with the concern expressed in Carolene Products and would speak to the
concern this paper notes in regards to political vulnerability in particular.
81 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
82 Mario Barnes and Erwin Chemerinsky, The Disparate Treatment of Race and Class in
ConstitutionalJurisprudence,72 LAW & CONTEMP PROBS. 109, 112-13 (2009).
83 Id. at 113-17.
84 Julie A. Nice, No Scrutiny Whatsoever: Deconstitutionalizationof Poverty Law, Dual Rules of
Law, and Dialogic Default, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629 (2008).
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Indeed, this type of vulnerability-that I will rephrase as susceptibility to
majoritarian domination due to one's status as a historically and currently
marginalized group-is particularly acute when it correlates with
subordinated racial status. Trina Jones has explained in the employment
law context how the intersection of race and class creates a "state of
frightening vulnerability" for minorities in the United States. 85 She has
shown that the staggering state of income inequality has grown
significantly so that more and more people, and particularly people of
color, exist in a state of true economic risk. 86 Bertrall Ross and Terry
Smith focus on how the poor are generally not responded to by political
87
parties, thus compounding their status.
Scholar john a. powell goes further in naming the extremely poor as
vulnerable. 88 Professor powell points to research showing that people's
perceptions of others as worthy of human concern is affected by social
categories. 89 Among these categories are the extreme poor, which Powell
recognizes as "the vulnerable in our society" who have been pushed out of
"the circle of human concern." 90 As such, he argues, they deserve
recognition as discrete and insular minorities. 91 It follows that such
exclusion and lowered status impacts the ability of the extreme poor, and
particularly the poor of color, to participate fully in the political system.
This is true in both a political theory sense as well as a practical sense.
Political theorist Robert Dahl in his work, On Political Equality, has
demonstrated how large-scale representative democracy can-and doesmarginalize the extreme poor while at the same time putting at risk the
larger project of political equality generally. Dahl premised his work on the
idea that political equality, that is, equality among all citizens of a
community within the civic and political spheres of life, is a worthwhile
goal. 92 Dahl then recognized that majority rule is validated as a means of
achieving that equality and that a democratic system accompanied by
93
certain fundamental rights is necessary for achieving that system. With
85 See generally Trina Jones, Race, Economic Class, and Employment Opportunity, 72 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 57 (2009).

86 Id.
87 See Bertrall L. Ross II and Terry Smith, Minimum Responsiveness and the Political Exclusion of
the Poor,72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197 (2009).

88 john a. powell, Constitutionalism and the Extreme Poor: Neo-Dred Scott and the Contemporary
"Discreteand InsularMinorities ", 60 DRAKE L. REV. 1069, 1079 (2012).

89 Id. at 1079.
90 Id. at 1080.
91 Id.
92 ROBERT A. DAHL, ON POLITICAL EQUALITY 6 (2006).

93 Id.
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these assumptions, Dahl theorized that the fundamental rights necessary to
democracy itself cannot legitimately be infringed by majorities whose
94
Put
actions are justified only by the principle of political equality.
another way, at the heart of a system whose goal is achieving political
equality for all its citizens, majorities should not deny the fundamental
rights that minorities possess because those denials would harm the
democratic system itself.
Dahl further recognizes that even if the vast majority believes that all
citizens should be entitled fundamental rights, this majority may
nonetheless fail to act to preserve those rights from infringement by
political leaders who possess greater resources for gaining their own
political ends. 95 In this sense, there is little incentive for the majority to
protect politically vulnerable minorities due to the fact that those in the
establishment may not have an interest in protecting the minority's rights
since it would not serve their own interests.
Dahl further recognizes that the political vulnerability generated by the
unequal distribution of wealth runs counter to the goal of political equality.
Specifically, he asserts that the unequal distribution of "political resources,
knowledge, skills, and incentives" runs "directly counter to political
equality." 96 These unequally distributed political resources include money
and social standing. 97 Dahl also discusses how the presence of a market
economy as a barrier to political equality makes political vulnerability
inherent: "A market economy inevitably and frequently inflicts serious
harm on some citizens. By producing great inequalities in resources among
citizens, market capitalism inevitably also fosters political inequality
among citizens of a democratic county. Yet a modem democracy has no
feasible alternative to an economy of market capitalism." 98
Dahl later draws an explicit connection between unequal resources and
increasing political inequality. He states that as income disparity has
increased, social mobility and educational equality have declined. 9 9 These
facts have led to the "ominous possibility" that "cumulative advantages in
power, influence, and authority of the more privileged strata may become
so great" that less privileged citizens may be "simply unable.., to make
the effort it would require to overcome the forces of inequality arrayed

94
95
96
97
98
99

Id. at
Id.at
Id. at
Id.
Id.at
Id.at

16.
17-18.
51.
67.
84.
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against them."1 00
B. Race, and the Lock-Out Phenomenon
This domination not only reaches those in extreme poverty; it affects
those who suffer racial domination. Indeed, the dual effects of economic
impoverishment and racial domination compound the subordination effect.
As we have seen, one of the dominant forces arrayed against AfricanAmericans is the structural force of racial oppression in the political
process. In each period of American history where minorities were given
more political rights, and thus more minorities ended up participating in the
political process, that increase in participation was sustained for a time, but
then as those who sought to maintain the power of the majority felt
threatened, they transformed the law (or its enforcement) to maintain their
control and suppress the minority.101 It is the pattern that history showed
us in the era after the First Reconstruction, and it is arguably the period we
are in now at the end of the Second Reconstruction. 102
And yet, unlike the period between Reconstruction and Jim Crow, where
white Americans suppressed the vote of African-Americans through
explicit and implicit barriers to voting, the political strength of minority
populations in the United States will increase as America diversifies.
Additionally, if history is any indicator, the diversification of America and
the creation of a majority-minority country will increase, rather than
decrease, racial balkanization and political conflict. 103
This state of affairs will create perverse incentives by current majorities
to deny and dilute the power of minorities via political competition and
100 Id.at 85.
101 See generally Reva B. Siegel, Why Equal ProtectionNo Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms
of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111 (1997) (explaining that the legal system
evolves to continue to enforce social stratification while the legal system is premised on a static notion
of discrimination).
102 See, Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Is This the Beginning of the End of the Second Reconstruction?,59
THE FED. LAW. 54, 54-57 (2012), http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/821 (discussing the
history and case law that derived from the enactment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965).
103 Recent demographic projections demonstrate that the number of minorities relative to the
current majority is increasing. U.S. Census Bureau Projections Show a Slower Growing, Older, More
Diverse
Nation
a
Half
Century
from
Now
(Dec.
12,
2012),
According to U.S.
http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/population/cb12-243.html.
Census Data, by 2043 the majority of the population in the United States will be people of color. Id.
Indeed, in Texas and other states in the southwest, minority majorities are forming and obtaining
political power due to their numerical majority, which will increase as populations increase and
minority group power will necessarily compete with the traditional majority that currently enjoys
power; William H. Frey, Shiftto a Majority-Minority Population in the U.S. Happening Faster than

Expected, BROOKINGS.EDU (Jun. 19, 2013 2:30 PM), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/upfront/posts/2013/06/19-us-majority-minority-population-census-frey.
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structural change. According to Brookings Institution analysis, three states
are already majority-minority: California, Texas, and New Mexico.1 04
Indeed, we have seen what are arguably the first aspects of this kind of
minority power discrimination in the recent, ongoing Texas voting rights
litigation.
At the heart of this problem is the use of facially neutral voting structure
changes, e.g., redistricting and voter identification laws, as a means to
control the market for political competition through what may be
considered actions akin to cartel behavior. 105 Moreover, arguments that
voter integrity concerns may be mere pretext for the desire to control the
political marketplace, and thus impact the rights of either collective
minorities or individuals exercising their right to vote. 106
This is compounded by the fact that many of the immigrant minority
communities of color in the United States, as well as the long-existing
historical communities of color in urban inner cities suffer a wide range of
political and economic disadvantages. Scholars like William Julius Wilson
have demonstrated that effectively these groups ought to be correctly.
considered the underclass of the United States.107 Moreover, scholarship
has developed to demonstrate that these groups suffer substantial
disadvantages due to residential segregation, educational opportunities, and
the ability to participate meaningfully in economic opportunities in
American society. Indeed, this is, as Daria Roithmayr has argued, due to
the structural racism that has continued and evolved over time in the United
States.108 These structural problems impact the ability of poor persons of
color to fully and meaningfully participate in the political process. These
structural problems also create openings for the perverse incentives of
majority policymakers who may become minorities in the foreseeable
future to exercise their power in such a way as to limit and marginalize
104 See Frey, supranote 103.
105 This argument, based on an analogy of looking at racist institutional behavior as driven by
cartel-like behavior. See Roithmayr, supra note 10 at 49-54. There, she explores the Texas white
primary cases of the early twentieth century and posits that this is an example of cartel behavior that
both explicitly discriminated, yet at the same time laid the groundwork for longer-term structural
discrimination. Id. It is this kind of structural, enduring discrimination that lies at the heart of the
intersection of race and class that this paper is attempting to explain. Id. Indeed, it is another way to
conceptualize the discussion in Part II and III.
106 In addition to conflict between whites and minority groups generally, there may also be conflict
between particular groups of people of color. Depending on the factual context, those conflicts may
represent either disputes between entrenched minorities who possess power, and minority groups who
do not feel the political establishment adequately represents them.
107 See, e.g., WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, MORE THAN JUST RACE: BEING BLACK AND POOR INTHE
INNER CITY 161 (Henry Louis Gates Jr., ed.,2009).
108 See generally Roithmayr, supra note 10, at 27-36.
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these persons of color.
The VRA, as it currently stands post-Shelby County, is of limited use to
address these claims. Moreover, the VRA as it is currently structured does
not even anticipate these future-looking problems. This paper, in the space
it has remaining, will speculate as to how to structure future legislation to
address these problems.
IV. REFOCUSING ON VULNERABILITY FROM THE RACE-PLUS-CLASS

VANTAGE POINT

Implicit throughout this paper is the idea that the retreat from race
conscious voting rights remedies may result in a resurgence of race-neutral
voting rights laws that actually end up discriminating. These laws may,
under the guise of neutrality, replicate the kinds of racial balkanization that
the VRA was meant to remedy. The curtailing of the federal constitutional
and statutory role in regulating voting, coupled with the perverse incentives
that come from fears of loss of power, may force an evolution in voting
rights that, to poor minorities, may create a new form of subjugation due to
a targeting based upon their race or ethnicity and the lack of economic
power to protect themselves from the domination. This may represent the
ultimate end of the Second Reconstruction and the beginning of a new
racial balkanization.
Although this is just an idea-which may prove to be wrong, despite
history suggesting otherwise-it nonetheless suggests that there remains a
role to play for Congress and the courts in maintaining and creating checks
on racial majorities to use their dominance to manipulate election rules to
diminish the political power of minority racial groups. Countering these
perverse incentives and managing conflict between majorities and
minorities and, eventually, racial pluralities, will be the necessary work of a
race conscious voting rights jurisprudence both today in the decades to
come.
Moreover, such race-conscious remedies should focus on the specific
intersections where voters tend to be affected because of their race within
the political process. As discussed earlier, voter identification laws and the
curtailing of expanded voting disproportionately affect those voters who
may find it difficult to absorb the indirect economic costs of voting;
arguably, these costs are increased by narrowing opportunities to vote
through more stringent identification requirements and narrow voting
windows. Similarly, the barriers of felon disenfranchisement affect poor
African Americans and Hispanics for similar reasons.
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This would suggest that electoral vulnerabilities that affect class and race
ought to be subjected to more significant judicial scrutiny. A jurisprudence
that focuses solely on race is susceptible to being ignored and ultimately
marginalized (though as this paper makes clear, this would be wholly
misguided in and of itself). The current majority analysis of the Court and
the debates concerning the most appropriate structure for courts to manage
the democratic process do not expressly take the intersection of class and
race into account. The central view of this paper is that this should be
corrected.
As a doctrinal matter, rooted in the first principle contained in footnote 4
of Carolene Products, our constitutional and policy structures should focus
on the susceptibility of discrete and insular groups to majoritarian
domination due to one's status as a historically and currently subordinated
community. I agree with john powell that this is the proper view
concerning these issues. 109
On another level, this is an intellectual shift since there is, in my opinion,
great hesitancy to see the status of poverty as meriting substantial
protection, and as I have expressed above, a number of ideological blinders
interfere with considering the structural problems imposed by race. Yet to
focus on this intersection is to recognize the underlying theme that
dominates the history and contemporary reality of vote suppression.
The dynamic of exclusion has shifted from express exclusion of certain
groups of people due to express white supremacy to relying on the
remnants of cartel structures that still have the policies and core premises
of exclusion and preference for those of property and of highest status.
From the beginning of the republic, and through the evolving forms of poll
taxes, felon disenfranchisement laws, literacy tests, and now voter
identification laws, the vulnerability of the poorest minority has been the
mechanism by which discrimination has been sanctioned. Attention to race
is correct, as Professor Overton explained, but the practice of majoritarian
domination of eligible voters has consistently focused on the intersection of
race and class. What was Jim Crow in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries is Ferguson, MO, in the twenty-first century.
One way to address this immediately is through the process to amend the
Voting Rights Act in the aftermath of Shelby County. The amendments
109 powell in his essay explicitly equates the "discrete and insular minority" of central concern in
Carlene Products with the poor and extreme poor. powell, supra n. 88 at 1076. This basic recognition
may be the doctrinal groundwork for a law of democracy jurisprudence concerning the law of politics
that provides protection for the poor, as is suggested by Harper. I hope to further this work in
subsequent articles.
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should focus on structural barriers created by issues like voter identification
laws, felon disenfranchisement laws, and other impediments that as a
matter of practice disproportionately affect the most vulnerable at the
intersection of race and class.
Indeed, these remedies may be focused on in various ways. First, in
analyzing the nature of the burden when it comes to calculating the burden
that may be placed upon voters with policies like voter identification laws,
the economic impact of such burdens should be considered. Rather than
assume that there are no transaction costs to a change, a state attempting to
create such laws should be required to create an economic impact statement
to calculate the various indirect cost that a regulation would require the
voter to meet, and that cost should be analyzed in a manner consistent with
an assessment of the burden on the voter. Thus, a projected burden of a
regulation on the voter could be calculated for consideration by a court
analyzing such claims.
Practices like felon disenfranchisement would require a different type of
consideration. I would propose a holistic consideration that considers not
only the constitutionality of such policies, but also the structural nature and
lockout effect of such policies should be implemented. As Professor
Rothmayr demonstrated with the white primary, felon disenfranchisement
laws also represent a type of cartel-like behavior through broad consensus
to effectively eliminate a group of voters from the electorate. It is the kind
of structural barrier that can only be addressed through wholesale political
change (given the utter abandonment of the doctrinal remedies for such
laws in Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act). But that change should be
grounded in political and judicial considerations of the broader structural
impact of these laws and how they replicate cycles of poverty and
subjugation.
This type of focus on political vulnerability due to the structural impact
of voter access laws goes far to address the deep structural barriers that
dissuade African-American voters on the basis of their race as well as can,
to a certain extent, be seen as having an impact without regard to race.
This dual awareness would have the potential of mollifying critics who
might attack such change on a post-racial basis, i.e., on the claim that race
conscious remedial steps are morally offensive or inherently problematic.
Ultimately, by focusing the use of race conscious remedies on the dual
concern regarding race and class, the law of the democratic process can
ultimately benefit racial progress while being conscious of the
vulnerabilities that may most create disparate racial treatment within the
democratic process. This kind of attention to the intersection of race and
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class will ultimately target the structural inequities in our society and insure
that each vote will be counted, without regard to the statuses that have
historically locked out our citizens from the electorate.

